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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS-II*
This is the second and concluding note on the defense of insanity
in criminal prosecutions. The first note' presented a survey of de-
cisions governing judicial interpretation of insanity as a defense.
This note will present suggestions relating to a procedure for diagnos-
ing abnormality more in keeping with modern psychiatric research
than that presently used. Wisconsin law, court decisions and statutory
enactments, will be the primary concern of the criticism.
In 1843, M'Naghten's Case2 was handed down, in which the
House of Lords" set forth the right and wrong test; the test that
is now universally accepted 3 by the American States and England.
When the test was propounded it was clearly an advance over pre-
vious rules4 laid down by the courts in diagnosing the diseased mind.
At its inception the sciences of psychiatry and psychology were prac-
tically non-existent. The physician of 1843 knew little more than the
layman in the diagnosis and prognosis of the mentally ill, and conse-
quently it was perfectly proper for the juror or the court to pass
upon the question of mental aberration. The test, therefore, was in
essence adopted as a tool for the non-expert. Its conception was
from the judicial rather than the medical mind. Approbation for
the rule stops at the period when psychiatry gained a foothold in
the field of medicine. No longer are the mentally diseased treated
as if they were infested with some metaphysical agent. The psychotic,
neurotic or feebleminded can now be diagnosed with reasonable cer-
tainty. The tests used in such diagnosis do not include the right
and wrong test.5 The question arises - what are the courts trying to
determine, whether the accused can differentiate right from wrong,
or whether he is insane? It is true in some cases the two may not
be mutually exclusive; however, in a dangerously large number of
cases they are. Courts repeatedly have denonced any criterion that
recognizes a type of aberration where the accused is insane, but
still can distinguish right from wrong.6 M'Naghten's Case originated
this, test as a necessary condition precedent to legal recognition of
abnormality, and courts insist that without it no man can be adjudged
*The writer recommends that the first article of this series be read before
this one, unless the reader has a fundamental knowledge of psychiatric termi-
nology and is familiar with judicial interpretation of insanity as used as a
defense in criminal cases.
I Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Prosecutions-i, 29 'Marquette Law Review
108 (1946).
2 M'Naughten's Case, House of Lords, 10 Clark and Fin, 200 (1843).
3 Weihofen, "Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law." 15 (1933).
4Arnold's Case, 16 Howell's Stite Trials 764 (1724) ; Hadfield's Case, 37
Howell's State Trials 1288 (1800).
5 "The Test of Legal Responsibility for Insane Persons," 72 Univ. of Penn.
Law Review 167, at page 169 (1924).
6 16 Corpus Juris 99-100 (1918).
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insane. The medical profession7 soon after the test was set forth,
denounced it as the sole criterion of insanity, but to little avail. How-
ever, courts have recognized that expert opinion in this field is
necessary, and as a result the medical profession has been allowed
to give the benefit of their knowledge on the subject. However, is
expert opinion given both pro and con the ultimate answer to the
problem? Weihofen, in his analysis of expert testimony in this field,
points out the following defects:
"Any reputable practicing physician is legally qualified to
speak as an expert on insanity, even though he may never
have had any instruction or experience in mental disease. As a
result, it is usually possible to hunt up some quacks or eccentric
"experts" whose fantastic theories will permit them to testify
as counsel wishes, even though no reputable psychiatrist would
agree with them. The jury is usually unable to distinguish
the competent expert from the incompetent, and obviously has
no means of knowing how many experts refused to testify
as counsel wished, before acceptable experts were found. The
law relies upon cross-examination to reveal the witness's in-
competency or inaccuracy, but as a matter of fact it is often
the witness whose judgment is unobscured by too much knowl-
edge of the subject who will be most positive in his assertions
and who will make the best impression on the jury. Further-
more, leaving the witness's qualifications to be brought out on
cross-examination too often leads to the sort of badgering
and bickering for which these cases have been notorious.
"The partisan nature of the expert's service makes it difficult
to obtain reliable and unbiased evidence. Allowing experts in
criminal trials to be called on behalf of the parties is peculiar to
the common law. It lies at the root of one of the great evils
of which such trials are productive - lack of that impartiality
which should be characteristic of scientific inquiry.
"The opinion testified to is often not based upon sufficient
scientific observation and examination. At best, an examination
made while the subject is in prison is not very satisfactory,
and often no really thorough physical, mental, and neurological
examination or study of the case history is even attempted,
the witness's opinion being based merely upon what the de-
fendant chooses to tell about himself or what his family tells
about. Worse yet, an expert who has not examined or even
seen the defendant at all is competent to testify in answer to
hypothetical questions. Such questions may include only facts,
proved or hoped to be proved, as tend to support the question-
er's side of the case. Moreover, the witness may not himself
believe in the truth of the facts assumed. The unfairness and
unsoundness of the use of hypothetical questions in these cases
has been pointed out by alienists repeatedly."
70rdronaux, Judicial Aspects of Insanity, 423 (1877).
8 Weihofen, "An Alternative to the Battle of Experts: Hospital Examination of
Criminal Defendants Before Trial," 2 Law and Contemporary Problems 419,
at page 420-421 (1935).
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Without further comment, the practice of employing experts by
counsel and by the state may well lead to more confusion than if
the jury were allowed to determine the issue by themselves. However,
the latter is by no means a satisfactory solution to the problem. Lay-
men cannot, and should not, be allowed to try the issue of insanity
by their own observation. What procedure, then, should be used?
The jury cannot be cast aside, since the United States Constitution9
provides for it, nor can expert testimony be disregarded since only
through it can the diagnosis be made.
PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION "BEFORE" TRIAL
In 1929 The American Bar Association" resolved the following:
"That there be available to every criminal and juvenile court
a psychiatric service to assist the court in the disposition of
offenders.
"That no criminal be sentenced for any felony in any case
in which the judge has any discretion as to the sentence until
there be filed as a part of the record a psychiatric report.
"That there be a psychiatric service available to every penal
and correctional institution.
"That there be a psychiatric report on every prisoner con-
victed of a felony before he is released.
"That there be established in each state a complete system
of administrative transfer and parole, and that there be no
decision for or against any parole or any transfer from one
institution to another, without a psychiatric report."
The introduction of a compulsory psychiatric examination before
trial is not a new or revolutionary addition in criminal procedure;
it has been in existence in the state of Maine"' for over one hundred
years. The statute of Maine provides for a period of hospitalization
before trial to determine whether or not the accused was so mentally
disordered at the time of the act as to be criminally irresponsible.
It thus refers only to the issue of insanity as a defense. Five other
9 United States Constitution, Article I, Section 7.
10 Reports of American Bar Association, Vol. 54, page 56 (1929).
"1 Revised Statutes of Maine (1930), Chapter 149, Section 1, which reads:
"When a person is indicted for an offense, or is committed to jail on a
charge thereof by a trial justice, or judge of a police or municipal court,
any justice of the court before which he is to be tried, if a plea of in-
sanity is made in court, or he is notified that it will be made, may, in
vacation or term time, order such person into the care of the superin-
tendent of either insane hospital, to be detained and observed by him
until further order of court, that the truth or falsity of the plea may be
ascertained. The superintendent of the hospital to which such person is
committed shall, within the first three days of the term next after such
commitment, and within the first three days of each subsequent term
so long as such person remains in his care, report to the judge of the
court before which such person is to be tried, whether his longer de-
tention is required for purposes of observation."
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states, Maryland,'12 Massachusetts,-3 New Hampshire,' 4 New York,"9
and Wisconsin 6 have statutes which provide for an examination to
determine if the accused is rational enough to undersand the nature
of the proceedings and to intelligently aid in the defense of his case.
Three other states, Colorado,17 Ohio, 8 and Vermont,29 have statutes
12 Annotated Code of Maryland, Vol. 2, Article 59, Section 6, which reads in
part:
"* * * The judge of the court in which such indictment or information
is pending shall have full power and authority at any time, before trial
to order an examination of the mental condition of such person by the
Board of Mental Hygiene ** **" (approved 1941).
'3 Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, Vol. 4, para. 100A, (approved April 23,
1941). The statute was recently interpreted in: Com. v. Gray, 314 Mass. 96,
49 N.E. (2nd) 603 at page 607 (1943), where the court held:
"The purpose of this statute requiring examination into an accused's
mental condition is to prevent an accused being put on trial unless his
mental condition is determined to be such as to render him responsible
to trial and punishment and unless he has no mental disease or defect
which interferes with his criminal responsibility."
14 Revised Laws of New Hampshire (1941) Vol. 1, Chapter 17, Section 13,
which reads:
"When a person is indicted for any offense, or is committed to jail
on any criminal charge to await the action of the grand jury, any justice
of the court before which he is to be tried, if a plea of insanity is made
in court, or said justice is notified by either party that there is a ques-
tion as to the sanity of the respondent, may in term time or vacation,
order such person into the care and custody of the superintendent of the
state hospital, to be detained and observed by him until further order of
the court, or until such person shall have been ordered discharged from
the hospital by its trustees upon a report by the superintendent
that such person is not insane."
25New York Statutes, Criminal Code, Vol. 66, Part 2, para. 658 (eff. 1939),
which reads:
"If at any time before final judgment it shall appear to the court
having jurisdiction of the person of a defendant indicted for a felony
or a misdemeanor that there is reasonable ground for believing that
such defendant is in such state of idiocy, imbecility or insanity that he
is incapable of understanding the charge, indictment or proceedings or
of making his defense, or if the defendant makes a plea of insanity to
the indictment, instead of proceeding with the trial, the court, upon it's
own motion, or that of the district attorney of the defendant, may in
its discretion order such defendant to be examined to determine the
question of his sanity."
This statute which provides for a judicial examination before trial
is not unconstitutional as denying the defendant "due process of law."
People ex rel Klesitz v. Mills, 179 Misc. 58 at page 63, 37 N.Y.S. (2nd)
185 (1942).
16 Wisconsin Statutes, Section 357.12 (1943).
17 Colorado Statutes Annotated, Vol. 1, Rule 35 (1935), which reads:
"In an action in which the mental or physical condition of a party is
in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order him to
submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician. The order
may be made only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to
the party to be examined and to all other parties and shall specify the
time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the
person or persons by whom it is to be made."
18 Throckmorton's Ohio Code Annotated, Section 134414 (1940), which reads
in part:
" * * * the court shall have power to commit the defendant to a
local insane hospital, or the Lenia State Hospital, where the defendant
shall remain under observation for such time as the court may direct
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which provide that whenever the plea of insanity is raised the de-
fendant is to be committed to a state hospital for observation. All
of these statutes, with the possible exception of Massachusetts, are
merely stepping stone in the direction of a complete determination
of the problem. The Wisconsin statute20 will be taken as illustrative.
It provides in part:
"1. Whenever, in any criminal case, expert opinion evidence
becomes necessary or desirable the judge of the trial court may
after notice to the parties and a hearing, appoint one or more
disinterested qualified experts, not exceeding three, to testify
at the trial.*** The fact that such expert witnesses have been
appointed by the court shall be made known to the jury, but
they shall be subject to cross-examination by both parties,
who may also summon other expert witnesses at the trial, but
the court may impose reasonable limitations upon the number
of witnesses who may give opinion evidence on the same subject.
"2. No testimony regarding the mental condition of the
accused shall be received from witnesses summoned by the
accused until the expert witnesses summoned by the prosecu-
tion have been given an opportunity to examine and observe
the accused, if such opportunity shall have been reasonably
demanded.
"3. Whenever the existence of mental disease on the part
of the accused, at the time of the trial, is suggested or becomes
the subject of inquiry, the presiding judge of the court before
which the accused is to be tried or is being tried may, after
reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing, commit the ac-
cused to a state or county hospital or asylum for the insane
to be detained there for a reasonable time, to be fixed by the
court, for the purpose of observation.*** In cases of commit-
ment to a hospital the court shall direct the superintendent of
the hospital to permit all the expert witnesses summoned in the
case to have free access to the accused for the purpose of
observation. The court may also direct the chief physician of
the hospital to prepare a report regarding the mental condition
of the accused. This report may be introduced in evidence at
the trial under the oath of the said chief physician who may be
cross-examined on the report by counsel for both parties.
not exceeding one month; and the court may in such cases appoint one
or more disinterested qualified physicians, * * * to investigate and
examine into the mental condition of the defendant and testify as ex-
perts at his trial or other hearing."
19 Public Laws of Vermont, Section 2429 (1933), which reads:
"When a person is indicted or informed against for a criminal offense,
or is committed to jail on a criminal charge by a justice's or municipal
court, the presiding judge of the county court before whom the per-
son is to be tried, may, in term time or vacation, if a plea of insanity is
made in court or if he is satisfied that a plea of insanity will be made,
order the person into the care of the superintendent of the Vermont
State hospital for the insane, to be detained and observed by the super-
intendent until further order of the judge or of such county court, that
the truth or falsity of such plea may be ascertained."
20 Fn. 16, supra, italics the author's.
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"4. Each expert witness appointed by the court may be
required by the court to prepare a written brief report under
oath upon the mental condition of the person in question and
such report shall be filed with clerk at such time as may be
fixed by the court. Such report may with the permission of
the court be read by the witness at the trial."
This statute is a step in the right direction. It shows an awareness
of the need for impartial testimony by providing for state examination.
However, a brief criticism of the law is necessary to show how
incompletely it resolves the problem. First, it gives the judge the
sole discretion in determining whether or not an examination is
necessary. To use an extreme example, the accused could be a raving
maniac, but if the judge thought he was sane there could be no
recourse, under this statute, to a state examination. Secondly, the
statute fails to do away with the battle of expert testimony, but
actually puts another player in the field. Under the statute, there
is not only the battle of the parties, but an additional battle between
the parties and the impartial witnesses. Thirdly, the statute has no
teeth. The important provisions are all qualified by the word may.
The statute comes to life only if the court injects life into it.
Finally, laymen are still the final determiners of the issue of insanity.
The court and jury can completely disregard the testimony presented
and decide the issue from their own reflection on the problem. The
testimony is merely an aid; it is not binding in the least.
The Massachusetts statute,21 while it is not a complete answer
to the problem, is the first legislation that attempts to make mental
examination a matter of routine. It provides in part:
"Whenever a person is indicted by a grand jury for a
capital offense or whenever a person, who is known to have
been indicted for any other offense more than once or to have
been previously convicted of a felony, is indicted by a grand
jury or bound over for trial in the superior court, the clerk
of the court in which the indictment is returned, or the clerk
of the district court or the trial justice, as the case may be,
shall give notice to the department, which shall cause such person
to be examined with a view to determine his mental condition
and the existence of any mental disease or defect which would
affect his criminal responsibility.***"
This statute provides many advantages. The principal ones are as
follows: (1) Certain classes of offenders are examined as a matter
of course; (2) examinations are made by neutral and unbiased
experts; (3) examinations are made before trial; (4) the examination
eliminates the special trial before judge and jury; (5) the examination
eliminates the open court and the subjection of the accused to the
21 Fn. 13, supra.
19461
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morbid public eye; (6) it eliminates time and money spent for
expert testimony before peers that cannot judge; (7) it eliminates
to some extent the possibility of offenders still suffering from a mental
defect being released into society; (8) it provides for the early dis-
covery of latent abnormality, and for partial prevention of many
who would continue in a life of crime.
Glueck 22 states that the Massachusetts statute is "the most radical
step yet taken to provide for the mental examination of accused
persons awaiting trial," but points out, by way of criticism, that it
applies only to capital offenders, and to persons indicted more than
once, that the system of reporting the cases is upon the shoulders
of clerks and is not obligatory unless they know of the offender's
previous record; and that it does not provide for a complete co-
ordination between trial judge and hospital. However, in spite of
these patent defects, Glueck2 states that the Massachusetts law,
"even as it stands today, is far in advance of any similar legislation
in any state of the Union," and as to its future application, writes:
"But perhaps the most important though least obvious role
which is being played by the unique Massachusetts law is that
of harbinger of a new criminal procedure toward which, it would
seem, the advance of criminological knowledge will gradually
force use: namely, the basing of the offender's treatment in
all cases - both as to length and type - not on the mechanical
dosages of punishment prescribed by legislatures in advance,
but on the rational exercise of judicial discretion enlightened
by scientific reports of psychiatric, psychological, and socio-
logical experts who should form an indispensible adjunct of
the criminal courts of tomorrow."
CONCLUSIONS
Even a brief examination of the field of psychiatry will illustrate
that it is one of our most technical sciences, and one that is extremely
dangerous when entered into by the untrained practitioner. The
necessity for impartial and qualified experts here is more important
than in many other fields because of the repercussions that may follow
if mistakes are made. Therefore, should the responsibility of the
uninformed to arrive at the correct prognosis be continued? Should
the use of obsolete criterions in determining the problem be con-
tinued? The answer is clear; the road to its final implementation is
almost equally clear. Statutes should be enacted which provide for
routine examinations in all criminal cases. Psychiatrists should be
free to use the tools of their trade in arriving at final determinations,
22Glueck, "Psychiatric Examination of Persons Accused of Crime," 36 Yale
Law Review 632, at page 645 (1927).
2S Ibid., at page 647.
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and should not be hampered by ancient measuring devices pro-
mulgated by courts over one hundred years ago. The sanctity of the
jury raises a difficult constitutional question. However, the Massa-
chusetts statute, which with certain exceptions, appears to meet the
problem, has been held constitutional24 against this objection. Finally
it is suggested that the proposed legislation should establish the basis
for accrediting, by some responsible and qualified organization such
as The American Medical Association, to the courts for this work
of competent and qualified experts. The ground work has been laid.
The working success of the Massachusetts law will become in-
creasingly more apparent, and may be the necessary impetus to uni-
form legislation on routine psychiatric examination in all criminal
cases before trial.
NoRRis NorDAHL
24 Com. v Gray, 314 Mass. 96, 49 N.E. (2nd) 603, at page 608 (1943).
1946]
